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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Alfonso Villanueva, Jr., appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of felony domestic battery. On appeal he argues the 
prosecutor committed misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error du ring 
her closing arguments. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In the early morning hours of June 25, 2013, Amanda Villanueva called 
911 and frantically reported that her father, Villanueva, had hit her mother, Maria 
Sanchez Trujillo, in the head with a beer bottle. (State's Exhibit 1; see also Tr., 1 
p.315, Ls.5-23 (Maria's relationship to Villanueva and Amanda).) Amanda told 
the 911 dispatcher that Maria was "bleeding everywhere" and that they were on 
the way to the hospital. (Id.) She also pleaded with the dispatcher to send 
police to Villanueva's residence because he was "crazy" and "said he might kill 
himself." (Id.) 
Officer Doug Harward was dispatched to the hospital. (Tr., p.191, L.10 -
p.192, L.13.) He made contact with Amanda and Maria in the waiting room and, 
at that time, observed that Maria was bleeding from her forehead. (Tr., p.192, 
Ls.14-23, p.193, Ls.12-17.) Maria was crying and shaking and "[a]ppeared 
1 The appellate record contains several volumes of separately bound transcripts. 
As used herein, ''Tr." refers to the volume containing the transcripts of 
Villanueva's second trial, which occurred on April 1-3, 2014, and of the 
sentencing hearing, which occurred on May 16, 2014. All other transcripts cited 
herein will be identified by the date of the proceeding to which the transcript 
relates. 
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fearful." (Tr., p.192, Ls.23-25.) Amanda was also crying and "[h]er voice 
quivered" when she spoke with the officer. (Tr., p.193, Ls.6-11.) Officer 
Harward accompanied Maria and Amanda to a treatment room and 
photographed Maria's injuries. (Tr., p.193, L.18 - p.195, L.1, p.201, L.23 -
p.203, L.16; State's Exhibits 29A, 31, 33, 35.) Maria's forehead was swollen and 
had a laceration that required five stitches. (Tr., p.202, L.4 - p.203, L.16, p.237, 
Ls.14-25; State's Exhibits 29A, 31, 33, 35.) When asked by her treating 
physician how she received her injuries, Maria said that "something was thrown 
at her and it hit her in the head." (Tr., p.205, Ls.12-23; see also Tr., p.235, L.19 
- p.236, L.15 (Maria told treating physician "she was struck with an object").) 
Officer Harward also spoke directly to Amanda and Maria about how 
Maria had been injured, and Amanda relayed the following information: Amanda 
and Maria were alone together in a car talking about how poorly Villanueva 
treated them. (Tr., p.351, L.21 - p.353, L.1.) During their conversation, Amanda 
heard her father laughing. (Tr., p.353, Ls.2-14.) Amanda "checked her cell 
phone and realized that it was called to the home phone and it was on speaker 
phone" and that Villanueva had overheard their conversation. (Tr., p.353, Ls.14-
18.) Amanda and Maria went home to attempt to talk to Villanueva. (Tr., p.353, 
Ls.19-23.) When Maria approached the front door, Villanueva met her there, 
"called her a bitch and told her to get the fuck out of there." (Tr., p.353, L.24 -
p.354, L.8.) Villanueva then threw what Amanda believed to be a beer bottle at 
Maria, and he pushed Maria, causing her to fall backwards. (Tr., p.354, Ls.9-20.) 
Maria "immediately started bleeding from her forehead." (Tr., p.354, Ls.13-15.) 
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After that, Villanueva "[i]ust slammed the door" and "[w]ent back inside." (Tr., 
p.354, Ls.21-23.) 
Maria relayed "basically the same" information Amanda provided. (Tr., 
p.355, Ls.5-8.) She told Officer Harward she and Amanda were "having a 
conversation that she was tired of how [Villanueva] had been treating them. She 
was tired of the situation she was in and was done." (Tr., p.355, Ls.8-11.) When 
she realized Villanueva had overheard their conversation, Maria was "highly 
concerned" and "decided it would be in her best interest to try and go back and 
try and talk with him and hash it out and try to figure out what was going on." 
(Tr., p.355, Ls.12-20.) When she got home, Maria walked up to the front door, 
but Villanueva "was waiting there, called her a bitch," and "[t]old her to get the 
fuck out." (Tr., p.355, Ls.21-25.) Villanueva then threw "something heavy" at 
her. (Tr., p.355, L.25 - p.356, L.2.) Maria "didn't believe it was a beer bottle. 
She just stated it was something heavy thrown at her." (Tr., p.356, Ls.2-3.) 
Maria said that, after Villanueva threw the heavy object at her, "she felt like she 
blacked out for a second. She realized that there was blood in her eyes so she 
couldn't see anything." (Tr., p.356, Ls.4-8.) Villanueva pushed Maria, causing 
her to fall backwards, and told her, "'Don't bother coming back because[,] if you 
do, you'll be really, really sorry .... " (Tr., p.356, Ls.8-20.) 
While Officer Harward was at the hospital talking to Amanda and Maria, 
other officers responded to Villanueva's residence. (Tr., p.134, L.13 - p.137, 
L.8, p.159, Ls.9-18, p.161, Ls.8-21.) After officers made several unsuccessful 
attempts to contact him, Villanueva finally came out of his house when his oldest 
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daughter arrived and allowed police to talk to Villanueva on her cell phone. (Tr., 
p.136, L.25 - p.138, L.14, p.149, Ls.8-24, p.163, L.1 - p.167, L.10, p.344, L.7 -
p.346, L.15.) While one officer interviewed Villanueva, other officers searched 
his front yard and found "[d]roplets of blood ... throughout the grass and along 
the sidewalk, driveway area around the house and pieces of a telephone - a 
cordless handset that were out in the yard. The battery and the back of the 
phone had separated from the phone itself and were scattered around the yard." 
(Tr., p.167, L.16 - p.168, L.16; see also State's Exhibits 7-29.) Officers did not 
find any sort of bottle during their search. (Tr., p.142, Ls.6-15.) 
When questioned about what had happened at his residence that 
evening, Villanueva told Officer Daniel Hoover that "his daughter had started 
some drama and he was in an argument with his family." (Tr., p.138, L.17 -
p.139, L.6, p.150, Ls.5-19; State's Exhibit 2.) Villanueva denied that the 
argument had gotten physical and said the blood in his front yard could have 
come from a dog. (Tr., p.139, Ls.13-22, p.140, Ls.3-7, p.151, L.2 - p.152, L.1; 
State's Exhibit 2.) Officer Hoover talked to Villanueva about the broken 
telephone and asked him if he had hit Maria with it. (Tr., p.140, Ls.20-23; State's 
Exhibit 2.) Villanueva denied having hit Maria with the telephone and stated he 
was not aware of any reason why Maria would have gone to the hospital. (Tr., 
p.140, Ls.12-25; State's Exhibit 2.) Villanueva did admit to having thrown the 
phone "up in the air," but he claimed he did so because he overheard Maria and 
Amanda talking about him and was "hurt" by their conversation. (Tr., p.141, 
Ls.1-9; State's Exhibit 2.) 
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Villanueva appeared intoxicated throughout his interview and admitted 
that he had been drinking vodka. (Tr., p.141, Ls.12-22; State's Exhibit 2.) He 
never asked where Maria was or express concern for her welfare, and he never 
admitted hitting Maria or claim that he accidentally hit her. (Tr., p. 141, Ls.23-25, 
p.142, L.16 - p.143, L.8; State's Exhibit 2.) At the conclusion of the interview, 
Officer Hoover arrested Villanueva for domestic battery. (Tr., p.145, L.24 -
p.146, L.1; State's Exhibit 2.) 
Less than 48 hours after Villanueva was arrested, Maria went to the 
Nampa Family Justice Center to meet with Detective Kari Seibel for a follow-up 
interview. (Tr., p.208, L.8 - p.211, L.20, p.363, L.10 - p.364, L.5.) When 
Detective Seibel met with her, Maria was "emotionally upset" and "crying." (Tr., 
p.211, Ls.21-25.) She told the detective that Villanueva's and her "phone had 
been destroyed when it was used to hit her in the head" (Tr., p.362, Ls.18-20), 
and "[s]he expressed several times that she was in fear for her safety when 
[Villanueva] was released" (Tr., p.362, Ls.10-13). She also told the detective that 
Villanueva's mother "had been contacting her since the incident" and "would be 
upset that the incident involved law enforcement." (Tr., p.361, Ls.10-18.) Maria 
was concerned that Villanueva's mother "may try to intimidate her." (Tr., p.361, 
Ls.19-21.) She also stated that, "since the incident," her step-son had driven by 
her residence "revving" his engine, and she was "fearful that there would be 
retaliation." (Tr., p.361, L.22 - p.362, L.2.) In response to Maria's concerns, 
Detective Seibel arranged for officers to conduct "extra patrol" around Maria's 
residence. (Tr., p.362, Ls.3-9.) 
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The state charged Villanueva with felony domestic battery. (R., pp.13-14.) 
At the preliminary hearing, Maria testified consistently with her statements to 
police near the time of the incident that, after she and Amanda returned to their 
residence, Villanueva told her to leave and threw a phone at her, resulting in the 
injury to her forehead. (Prelim. Tr., p.19, L.22 - p.25, L.7.) When called as a 
witness by the defense, however, Maria testified that she believed Villanueva's 
act of hitting her in the head with the phone was an accident. (Prelim. Tr., p.45, 
L.18 - p.46, L.11.) Amanda also testified for the defense and claimed Villanueva 
threw the phone "[t]owards" Amanda and Maria after Amanda asked to use it. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.50, L.18 - p.57, L.18.) At the conclusion of the preliminary 
hearing, the magistrate found probable cause to believe that Villanueva 
committed a felony domestic battery and bound the case over to district court. 
(R., pp.58-61; Prelim. Tr., p.59, Ls.5-17.) 
The day before trial, Detective Seibel served Maria with a subpoena, but 
Maria indicated she would not be "coming to court." (1/21/14 Tr., p.90, L.18 -
p.91, L.16.) Detective Seibel then obtained a material witness warrant, but Maria 
was not home when the detective attempted to serve it. (1/21/14 Tr., p.91, L.17 
- p.92, L.19; see also 1/21/14 Tr., p.174, L.17 - p.176, L.4 (investigator for 
prosecutor's office attempted unsuccessfully to locate Maria at either her house 
or place of employment in the days leading up to trial).) The case nevertheless 
proceeded to trial, with the state calling as witnesses in its case-in-chief the 911 
dispatcher and the investigating officers. (See generally 1/21/14 Tr., pp.72-94, 
128-72, 183-94, 199-218.) The state also called Dr. Lisa Marie Growette 
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Bostaph, who testified as an expert regarding the dynamics of domestic violence, 
the frequency and reasons for victim recantation, and the preference for 
"victimless prosecution." (1/21/14 Tr., p.109, L.17-p.128, L.3.) 
After the state rested, the defense called both Amanda and Maria as 
witnesses in its case-in-chief. (See generally 1/21/14 Tr., pp.227-55, 257-89.) 
Contrary to the statements she made on the night of the incident, Amanda 
testified that Villanueva's act of hitting Maria in the head with the telephone was 
an accident. (1/21/14 Tr., p.246, Ls.8-11.) According to Amanda, the reason 
Villanueva and Maria were arguing was because Amanda was using drugs and 
not following her parents' rules and because Villanueva had ordered Amanda to 
move out. (1/21/14 Tr., p.228, L.19 - p.233, L.11.) She testified that she and 
Maria left the house but came back when they discovered a friend Amanda had 
arranged to stay with was not home. (1/21/14 Tr., p.233, Ls.12-23.) Amanda 
claimed that, when they got back to the house, she asked Villanueva if she could 
use the telephone. (1/21/14 Tr., p.233, L.24 - p.234, L.14.) At that point, 
according to Amanda, Villanueva "tossed" the phone in an "underhand motion"; 
Amanda tried to catch it, but Maria "got in the way" and the phone struck her in 
the head. (1/21/14 Tr., p.234, L.1 - p.237, L.5, p.250, L.24 - p.251, L.5, p.252, 
L.14 - p.253, L.18.) Amanda acknowledged having told the 911 dispatcher and 
police that Villanueva had hit Maria with a beer bottle, but she testified she lied to 
police on the night of the incident because she was angry with Villanueva for 
having kicked her out. (1/21/14 Tr., p.237, L.20 - p.241, L.4, p.246, L.19 -
p.248, L.25, p.249, Ls.14-22, p.251, L.20 - p.252, L.13.) She also testified that 
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she told the prosecutor on more than one occasion that she had lied to the 
police, but the prosecutor "said she didn't believe it" and "to move on" and "not 
think about it." (1/21/14 Tr., p.241, L.5 - p.242, L.8, p.249, L.5 - p.250, L.3.) 
Maria's trial testimony essentially mirrored that of Amanda's. She testified 
that Villanueva and Amanda were arguing because Amanda was using drugs 
and not following the rules of the house. (1/21/14 Tr., p.263, L.23- p.264, L.25.) 
After Villanueva told Amanda to leave, Maria gave Amanda a ride to a friend's 
house but, when the friend was not home, Maria and Amanda went back to their 
house. (1/21/14 Tr., p.266, Ls.3-25.) According to Maria, when they got back 
home, Amanda asked Villanueva if she could use the house phone to call her 
cell phone, which Maria claimed Amanda had lost. (1/21/14 Tr., p.267, Ls.5-16.) 
Villanueva then "passed" the phone to Amanda and, the "[n]ext thing" Maria 
knew, she "felt something on [her] forehead." (1/21/14 Tr., p.267, L.17 - p.270, 
L.21.) Like Amanda, Maria acknowledged the statements she made to police on 
or near the night of the incident but, also like Amanda, Maria testified she had 
told the police "many lies," purportedly because she "was protecting [her] 
daughter." (1/21/14 Tr., p.272, L.2 - p.274, L.2, p.281, L.10 - p.284, L.24.) 
Maria testified that Villanueva did not intentionally hit her in the head with the 
phone and that it was an accident. (1/21/14 Tr., p.274, L.23 - p.25.) She also 
testified she was "angry with the prosecutor's office" because she had "gone to 
them and told them that [she] would like to have this matter dropped and they 
totally ignored" her. (1/21/14 Tr., p.287, Ls.13-19.) 
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After eight hours of deliberations, the jury was unable to reach a 
unanimous verdict. (R., p.138; see also Tr., p.7, L.25 - p.8, L.6.) The district 
court declared a mistrial. (R., p.138.) 
At Villanueva's retrial, the state again presented the testimony of the 911 
dispatcher, the investigating officers, and Dr. Bostaph. (See generally Tr., 
pp.121-57, 159-217, 252-75; see also Tr., pp.232-40 (testimony of emergency 
room physician).) The state elected not to call Amanda or Maria as witnesses 
and, before the state rested, the prosecutor successfully moved to exclude from 
the defense case any reference by Amanda or Maria to the fact that they were 
unhappy with the prosecutor's office for pursuing the charge and had told the 
prosecutor that Villanueva's act of hitting Maria in the head with the phone was 
an accident. (Tr., p.227, L.19 - p.231, L.1, p.242, L.19 - p.247, L.20; see also 
Tr., p.304, L.3 - p.306, L.3 (trial court denying defense counsel's request to 
present evidence of a conversation between Amanda and the prosecutor during 
which the prosecutor, in response to Amanda's tearful claim that Maria's injury 
was the result of an accident, allegedly told Amanda "that she was a baby, that 
she needed to grow up and that she needed to forget about her dad").) After the 
state rested, the defense called Amanda and Maria, both of whom testified to a 
version of events consistent with the testimony they gave at Villanueva's first 
trial. (See generally Tr., pp.287-339.) 
At the conclusion of the second trial, the jury found Villanueva guilty of 
felony domestic battery. (R., p.271; 4/3/14 Tr., p.16, L.2 - p.18, L.25.) The 
district court imposed a unified sentence of six years, with two and one-half 
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years fixed. (R., pp.293-94; Tr., p.455, Ls.3-8.) Villanueva timely appealed from 
the judgment. (R., pp.295-96, 307-18.) 
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ISSUE 
Villanueva states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct depriving Mr. Villanueva of 
his right to a fair trial by making factual assertions the prosecutor 
knew to be false? 
(Appellant's brief, p.10.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
Has Villanueva failed to carry his burden of showing fundamental error 
with respect to his unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct? 
11 
ARGUMENT 
Villanueva Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His 
Unpreserved Claim Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal Villanueva argues the prosecutor made 
statements during her closing arguments that constituted prosecutorial 
misconduct and amounted to fundamental error. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-17.) 
Specifically, he contends the prosecutor "purposefully deceived the jury by 
repeatedly arguing that Maria and Amanda had not shared the version of events 
they testified to with anyone prior to trial, knowing full well that Maria and 
Amanda had shared this version multiple times, including during their prior 
testimony." (Appellant's brief, p.17.) The state acknowledges that the 
complained of arguments were improper. Villanueva's claim of fundamental 
error nevertheless fails because he cannot demonstrate from the record that the 
prosecutor's arguments affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial." State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694,715,215 P.3d 414,435 (2009). If a defendant fails to 
timely object at trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, 
the conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing 
by the defendant that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental 
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error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). To show 
fundamental error the appellant must demonstrate all of the following: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
lsL. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted). 
C. Villanueva's Argument Fails On The Prejudice Prong Of The Fundamental 
Error Test 
"Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than 
the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, 
including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this 
impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial, and hence is 
reviewable as fundamental error." State v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404, 418, 313 
P.3d 732, 746 (2013) (brackets and internal quotations omitted) (citing Perry, 
150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979; State v. Frauenberger, 145 Idaho 294, 303, 
297 P.3d 257, 266 (Ct. App. 2013)); accord State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 
_, 348 P.3d 1, 55 (2014); State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 868, 332 P.3d 767, 
780 (2014). While "[b]oth sides have traditionally been afforded considerable 
latitude in closing argument," that latitude "has its limits, both in matters 
expressly stated and those implied." Moses, 156 Idaho at 868, 332 P.3d at 780 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). A prosecutor exceeds that latitude by 
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'"misrepresent[ing] or mischaracterize[ing) the evidence in closing argument."' 
Moses, 156 Idaho at 871, 332 P.3d at 783 (quoting State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 
125, 133, 294 P.3d 1137, 1145 (Ct. App. 2013)). "Indeed, 'the prosecutor has a 
duty to avoid misrepresentation of the facts and unnecessarily inflammatory 
tactics."' !ft (quoting State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166, 610 P.2d 522, 525 
(1980), overruled on other grounds by State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 630 P.2d 
674 (1981)). 
Applying these principles in Moses, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed 
a claim that the prosecutor in that case committed misconduct rising to the level 
of fundamental error by misrepresenting the terms of a witness' immunity 
agreement during his closing argument at Moses' trial for grand theft by 
extortion. Moses, 156 Idaho at 870-71, 332 P.3d at 782-83. The immunity 
agreement, which was not entered into evidence at trial, provided that the 
witness' "testimony at Moses' preliminary hearing would not be used against [the 
witness] 'in any manner in a criminal case, except that he may nevertheless be 
prosecuted or subjected to penalty for perjury, false swearing, or contempt .... "' 
!ft at 870, 332 P.3d at 783. At trial, evidence was presented that the witness 
understood the terms of the immunity agreement to mean that he could not "be 
prosecuted for what [he] testified to" at the preliminary hearing. !ft In closing 
argument, the prosecutor argued to the jury that the witness' immunity "means 
that whatever he says he can't get in trouble for, so whatever he says might as 
well benefit himself. What benefits him is staying in [Moses'] good graces." !ft 
(brackets in original). 
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On appeal from his conviction, Moses argued for the first time that "the 
prosecutor misled the jury as to the terms of [the witness'] immunity agreement" 
by representing that the witness "faced absolutely no penalty for anything he 
might say at the preliminary hearing when, in fact, the immunity agreement set 
forth numerous potential penalties should [the witness] falsely testify." & 
(internal quotations omitted). The state argued in response that "the prosecutor 
was only reiterating [the witness'] testimony as to his understanding of the 
immunity agreement" and was not "testifying as to what the agreement actually 
provided." & The Idaho Supreme Court rejected the state's argument, 
reasoning: 
From his testimony, it appears that [the witness] may well have 
believed that he could not be prosecuted at all for his testimony. 
However, the prosecutor was aware of the actual terms of the 
agreement, and his argument misstated those terms. He did not 
qualify his argument by stating he was only reiterating how [the 
witness] understood the agreement. 
& at 870-71, 332 P.3d at 782-83. The Court also rejected the state's argument 
that the alleged error was not "plain," explaining: 
[T]he prosecutor has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of the facts 
and unnecessarily inflammatory tactics. Here, the prosecutor fell 
short of that standard by claiming without qualification that [the 
witness] could not get in trouble for his testimony at Moses' 
preliminary hearing. The immunity agreement is clear that [the 
witness] could be prosecuted for false testimony; claiming 
otherwise was a misrepresentation. 
& at 871, 332 P.3d at 783 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Despite having found "misconduct" that was plain on the record, the Court 
nevertheless concluded that Moses failed to carry his burden of demonstrating 
fundamental error because he "failed to show that his substantial rights were 
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affected - that the error affected the outcome of the trial." kl. (citing Perry, 150 
Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978). In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted the 
witness to whom the immunity had been extended "was an unreliable witness 
and his testimony was undermined by far more than the prosecutor's 
mischaracterization of the immunity agreement." kl. The Court also noted the 
jury had been instructed "that the prosecutor's comments were not evidence" 
and, therefore, it held "any error with regard to the prosecutor's misstatement of 
the immunity agreement could not have affected the outcome of the trial." kl. 
The reasoning and result of Moses apply equally to the facts of this case. 
During the course of her closing arguments, the prosecutor represented to the 
jury that Amanda and Maria had never before shared with anyone the version of 
events they testified to at Villanueva's second trial. (See Tr., p.404, Ls.17-20 
(arguing Amanda and Maria have "had eight months to think about what they're 
going to say at trial"); p.406, Ls.2-7 ("Only eight months later at trial are you 
hearing about [Amanda's and Maria's version] for the first time."); p.423, Ls.20-
21 ("So how are you supposed to accept that they're telling the truth now but 
they lied every other occasion?"); p.425, Ls. 7-10 ("The first mention of [Amanda 
using drugs and Villanueva kicking her out) is at trial."); p.426, Ls.15-18 ("Maria 
got up on the stand, said that she lied, said that she didn't remember, said 
everything that happened was an accident. That now she was suddenly telling 
the truth .... ").) Although there was no evidence presented at the second trial 
that Amanda and Maria had previously claimed that Villanueva's act of hitting 
Maria in the head with the phone was an accident (see generally Tr.), it is clear 
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from the record that the prosecutor was actually aware that Amanda and Maria 
had repeatedly made such claims, including in their prior testimony (see, ~. 
Tr., p.227, L.228, L.17, p.242, L.13 - p.243, L.16). Because the prosecutor had 
a duty to avoid misrepresenting the facts, her arguments conveying to the jury 
that Amanda and Maria had never before told anyone that Maria's injuries were 
the result of an accident - like the arguments made by the prosecutor in Moses -
were plainly improper. 2 As in Moses, however, the error is not fundamental 
because Villanueva cannot show from the record that the prosecutor's 
arguments affected his substantial rights. 
In light of Amanda's and Maria's trial testimony, the issue the jury had to 
decide in this case was whether Villanueva's act of striking Maria in the head 
with a telephone was intentional or an accident. In an effort to discredit 
Amanda's and Maria's testimony, the prosecutor properly could, and did, point to 
the evidence showing that, on and near the night Maria was treated at the 
hospital, neither Amanda nor Maria told anyone that Maria's injuries were the 
result of an accident and, in fact, they claimed the opposite. (See, ~. Tr., 
p.396, Ls.18-22, p.399, L.22 - p.400, L.7, p.400, L.25-p.401, L.14, p.402, L.14 
2 While the state acknowledges the complained of arguments were improper, the 
state cannot agree with Villanueva's assertions on appeal that the prosecutor 
"purposely deceived the jury." (Appellant's brief, p.17.) Instead, it appears the 
prosecutor was attempting to constrain her arguments to the evidence that was 
presented which, admittedly by design, did not include any reference to the fact 
that Amanda and Maria had previously claimed the incident that led to the felony 
domestic battery charge was merely an accident. Nevertheless, because the 
prosecutor was aware that Amanda and Maria had actually made such claims on 
prior occasions, the prosecutor's arguments to the contrary were improper. 
Moses, 156 Idaho at 870-71, 332 P.3d at 782-83. 
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- p.404, L.16, p.405, L.23 - p.406, L.5.) There can be no question that, had the 
prosecutor simply represented to the jury that Amanda and Maria changed their 
stories sometime after they reported the incident to 911 and investigating 
officers, such argument would have been proper. Although it was error for the 
prosecutor to tell the jury that Amanda and Maria had never disclosed their 
"accident" version of events until trial, there is no reasonable possibility that the 
prosecutor's representations about the timing of the change of story affected the 
outcome of the trial because, ultimately, it had very little bearing on the jury's 
determination of which version of events to believe. 
The jury received evidence, in the form of Dr. Bostaph's testimony, that it 
is not uncommon for victims of domestic violence to initially report the abuse but 
then recant "once the criminal justice system has come into play and that 
incident is calmed down and they're no longer in fear." (Tr., p.261, L.20 - p.262, 
L.16; see also Tr., p.262, L.17 - p.270, L.11 (additional testimony regarding 
dynamics of domestic violence, reasons for recantation, and preference for 
"evidence-based" prosecution).) In light of this evidence, the exact timing of 
Amanda's and Maria's recantation was not particularly important; rather, the 
salient issues for the jury to decide were whether Amanda and Maria had any 
motive to recant and which version of events - the one they initially reported to 
police or the one they testified to at trial - was true. Contrary to Villanueva's 
assertions on appeal that the state's case was weak (Appellant's brief, p.16), 
there was an abundance of evidence - much of which the prosecutor properly 
referred to during closing argument - demonstrating that neither Amanda nor 
18 
Maria were reliable witnesses and that their reports to the 911 dispatcher and 
investigating officers on or near the night of the incident that Villanueva 
intentionally struck Maria in the head with a telephone actually reflected the truth. 
The evidence showed that, when Amanda called 911, she was frantic and 
reported that Villanueva was "crazy" and had hit Maria in the head with what she 
believed was a beer bottle. (State's Exhibit 1.) At the hospital, Amanda and 
Maria told the investigating officer that Villanueva had overheard them talking 
about him and, when they went back home, Villanueva called Maria a "bitch," 
told her to "get the fuck out," and threw something heavy at her. (Tr., p.351, L.21 
- p.354, L.15, p.355, L.8 - p.356, L.20.) Amanda's and Maria's statements in 
this regard were corroborated by Villanueva's own statements to police that he 
overheard Maria and Amanda talking about him and was "hurt" by their 
conversation. (State's Exhibit 2.) They were also corroborated by the physical 
evidence outside of Villanueva's residence, including the droplets of blood - for 
which Villanueva offered no credible explanation - and the broken telephone 
handset - which Villanueva admitted having thrown in the air. (Tr., p.139, Ls.13-
22, p.140, L.20-p.141, L.6, p.167, L.16-p.168, L.16.) 
Although Amanda and Maria later claimed the telephone accidentally hit 
Maria while Villanueva was attempting to "toss" or "pass" it to Amanda (Tr., 
p.298, L.23 - p.300, L.2, p.320, L.22 - p.325, L.12), neither Amanda nor Maria 
told anyone on or near the night of the incident that Maria's injuries were the 
result of an accident (Tr., p.207, Ls.8-12, p.217, Ls.5-15, p.233, L.6 - p.237, L.5, 
p.238, L.13 - p.240, L.2, p.351, L.21 - p.356, L.20, p.361, L.10 - p.362, L.20; 
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State's Exhibit 1 ). In fact, the day after she was treated at the hospital, Maria 
told a detective that she was afraid for her safety when Villanueva got out of jail, 
and she expressed fear both that Villanueva's family may try to intimidate her 
and "that there would be retaliation." (Tr., p.361, L.10 - p.362, L.13.) Nor was 
the "accident" version consistent with Villanueva's statements to law 
enforcement. Again, when asked by police how the telephone ended up in 
pieces in the yard, Villanueva claimed he threw it "up in the air" because he was 
"hurt" after overhearing the conversation between Amanda and Maria (Tr., p.140, 
L.20 - p.141, L.6; State's Exhibit 2); Villanueva never claimed that Amanda 
asked to use the_ phone, never claimed that he tossed the phone to her, and 
never claimed that he hit Maria with the phone but that it was an accident (Tr., 
p.141, Ls.23-25; see generally State's Exhibit 2). 
Finally, both Maria and Amanda testified at trial that they loved Villanueva 
and did not want to see him in any trouble. (Tr., p.308, Ls.2-5, p.328, Ls.5-8; 
see also Tr., p.336, Ls.18-21 (Maria testifying Villanueva is "the love of my life").) 
When asked if she was worried about what would happen if Villanueva was 
convicted, Maria testified, "I am worried and he is my husband of my entire life 
and I need him at home," and "I am worried because I can't live without him." 
(Tr., p.328, L.16 - p.329, L.4.) 
Taken together, the foregoing evidence overwhelmingly established that 
Amanda and Maria had a motive to recant and that the version of events they 
testified to at trial was not credible. Although the prosecutor erred by 
representing the recantations occurred for the first time at trial as opposed to 
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earlier in the criminal process, she did not, as suggested by Villanueva on 
appeal, rely solely on the timing of the recantations "to argue[] to the jury that 
Maria and Amanda were not worthy of belief." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) To the 
contrary, the prosecutor spent the majority of her closing arguments pointing to 
the evidence that showed Amanda's and Maria's initial reports were corroborated 
and their trial version was not. (See generally Tr., pp.396-408, 423 - p.431.) 
Because the evidence showed, independently of the prosecutor's improper 
argument, that Amanda and Maria were not reliable witnesses, Villanueva has 
failed to demonstrate from the record a reasonable possibility that the 
prosecutor's representations about the timing of the recantations in any way 
affected the outcome of the trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment entered 
on the jury verdict finding Villanueva guilty of felony domestic battery. 
DATED this 3rd day of November 2015. 
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